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Abstract
This study comparatively assesses the influence of board busyness (i.e., multiple directorships 
of outside directors) on stock market valuations of both Islamic and conventional banks. For 
a sample of listed banks from 11 countries for the period 2010–2015, results show that board 
busyness is differentially priced by investors depending on the bank type. In conventional 
banks, board busyness is significantly and positively valued by the stock market. This result 
suggests that investors perceive some reputational benefits arising from a busy board (e.g., 
extended industry knowledge, established external networks or facilitation of external market 
sources). In contrast, we find no supporting evidence on the market valuations of board busy-
ness in Islamic banks. This result might be attributed to, both, the complex governance structure 
and the uniqueness of the business model which require additional effective monitoring, relative 
to that employed in conventional banking. Our results also show that investors provide signifi-
cantly low market valuations for busy Shari’ah advisory board which acts as an additional layer 
of governance in Islamic banks. Findings in this study offer important policy implications to 
international banking studies and regulations governing countries with dual-banking systems.
Keywords Firm valuations · Board busyness · Banking systems · Stock market
JEL Classification C23 · G01 · G21 · G28 · L50 · M41
1 Introduction
Regulators and market participants in capital markets have long emphasised on the critical 
role of the board of directors, as a core corporate governance mechanism, in promoting 
a country’s economic growth and financial stability. A weak system of governance tends 
to offer substantial managerial opportunities to engage in risk-taking activities and fraud-
ulent acts. Extant literature (e.g., Mallette and Fowler 1992; Faleye et  al. 2018; Lu and 
Boateng 2017; Jouida 2019) documents that an effective board of directors can monitor top 
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management on behalf of shareholders to reduce information asymmetry between manag-
ers and shareholders and thereby lessen agency costs. Resource dependence theorists assert 
that a board of directors is “a provider of resources, such as legitimacy, advice and coun-
cil links to other organizations” (Hillman and Dalziel 2003, p. 383). Therefore, the qual-
ity of board monitoring and their engagements in managerial decision-making can have 
direct implications on firm value (Yermack 1996; Lin and Liu 2009; Liu 2015; Meng et al. 
2018). Moreover, the uniqueness of governance in banking alongside the opacity related 
to several banking transactions imply a dominant impact of effective monitoring by the 
board of directors on investors’ trust and optimism (Adams and Mehran 2003; Faleye and 
Krishnan 2017). Appointing an outside busy board member (i.e., holding multiple direc-
torships) can, hence, affect investors’ perceptions of their firm value. Furthermore, in line 
with the agency theory, investors are likely to pay more for bank equity when their interests 
are aligned with those of directors and managers. In other words, a bank market value is 
likely to increase as the agency conflicts diminish because such lower agency costs can 
effectively protect investors’ wealth. From this perspective, board busyness can influence 
bank market value by either restricting or encouraging managers from expropriating bank 
resources. This depends on the levels of agency costs and the complexity of a bank busi-
ness model.
Arguably, busy boards can offer reputational benefits to their firms such as extended 
business networking/connections and quick access to market resources (Brennan et  al. 
2016). Holding multiple board seats can also promote effective monitoring due to rich 
experience and valuable skills from serving many firms (Jiraporn et al. 2008). This might 
enhance the quality of long-term decision making, and hence, such reputational benefits 
might lead to favourable implications on firm value (Field et  al. 2013; Muravyev et  al. 
2016; Chou and Feng 2018). In contrast, other prior studies still suggest that board busy-
ness can result in over-commitment and limited availability by boards who might be 
unable to fulfil their fiduciary duties and scrutinise risk-taking activities (Fich and Shiv-
dasani 2006; Falato et al. 2014; Chou and Feng 2018), leading to adverse impact(s) on firm 
valuation.
Evidence on the market valuations of busy boards of directors is limited (e.g., Ferris 
et al. 2003; Cashman et al. 2012), focused on non-financial firms (i.e., the industrial sector) 
and provided mixed findings. Within the banking setting, examining stock market valu-
ations (see Caprio et  al. 2007; Belkhir 2009; Zulkafli et  al. 2010) is restricted to focus 
only on other corporate governance mechanism and characteristics (e.g., ownership struc-
ture, shareholder protection laws, board size, and CEO duality). Therefore, relatively little 
is known about whether board busyness can either improve or detriment the bank market 
value. Moreover, none of the prior studies in banking has given attention to the possible 
systematic differences of stock market valuations for busy boards across alternative bank 
types.
An ideal setting for such an investigation is the unique systems of governance and busi-
ness models employed by the Islamic versus conventional banks.1 Investigating the effects 
of busy boards across the two systems is important to the on-going debate associated with 
1 The operations of Islamic banks are principally driven by a constrained banking model, which inherits 
both moral accountability values and legal responsibilities (Abdelsalam et al. 2016). Islamic banks operate 
on a business model that prohibits interests, complex derivatives, short-selling, aggressive risk-taking and 
speculation while they encourage risk-profit sharing between the firms and their depositors. Meanwhile, 
conventional banks provide their services on interest-basis.
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factors contributing to the resilience and stability of both banking sectors (see Čihák and 
Hesse 2010; Abedifar et  al. 2013; Beck et al. 2013). The rapid growth of Islamic banks 
implies that the impact of this bank type on the global economy might be substantial.2 
The financial crisis in 2007 has also extended the attraction of exploring the market valua-
tion of the Islamic banking model in comparison to conventional banking by practitioners 
and monetary authorities, to explore a viable and resilient alternative financial system to 
the conventional banking system (Wilson 2009). Islamic banks conduct operations based 
primarily on profit-loss sharing (PLS) arrangements, in which contracts between the banks 
and their depositors are equity-based (Olson and Zoubi 2008; Mollah et al. 2017).
The governance structure employed by Islamic banks is likely to be more compli-
cated than that of conventional (Safieddine 2009; Mollah and Zaman 2015). In both bank 
types, the board of directors is responsible for the implementation of strategic decisions, 
protection of the shareholders’ interest and maximisation of the bank value. However, for 
Islamic banks, under the constrained banking model and the nature of the products/services 
offered, board of directors has additional responsibilities related to the establishment of the 
appropriate Shari’ah governance framework besides the development of relevant policies 
to ensure that all activities are conducted in compliance with the Shari’ah law (Quttainah 
et al. 2013). Furthermore, for Islamic banks, additional agency costs are likely to be associ-
ated with the Islamic banking model. This is due to a peculiar institutional environment in 
Islamic banks including the special bank-depositors’ relationship.3 Moreover, unlike the 
single governance-layer in conventional banks (i.e., board of directors), Islamic banks are 
subject to a double-governance mechanism by a Shari’ah Supervisory Board (i.e., SSB) 
in addition to their regular board of directors.4 Decisions by the board of directors depend 
much on the supervision effectiveness of SSB for Shari’ah compliance (Mollah and Zaman 
2015). SSB is hence referred as “supra authority” which monitors the board of directors’ 
decisions to ensure that they execute the ex-ante approved products/services (Beekun and 
Badawi 2005; Godlewski et al. 2016; Alsaadi et al. 2017). Finally, the structure and fea-
tures of Islamic banking governance indicate that the popularity and the scarcity of experts 
in Shari’ah legitimacy on a global basis for both boards of directors and SSB have contrib-
uted to the busyness of the two boards in Islamic banks.5
Accordingly, the natures, qualities, and commitments of the board of directors in the 
two bank types are dissimilar (Mollah et al. 2017) and can have implications on investors’ 
valuation of board busyness. Under the presence of structural differences between conven-
tional and Islamic banking business models, our premise is that differential stock market 
valuations of board busyness across the two bank types is plausible. Investors within the 
2 The annual growth of Islamic banking is around 20% in 2012 (Malkawi 2013). Until 2015, their total 
assets reach $1.38 trillion, which is projected to further increase to $6.5 trillion by 2020 (IFSB 2017). From 
1998 to 2005, Islamic banks showed tremendous growth in their assets by 111% while conventional banks 
only grew by 6% (Khan 2010).
3 With the absence of representation on the board of directors for depositors, Islamic bank managers have 
full control of the investment process of depositors’ funds which suggest high agency problems.
4 AAOIFI standard defines Shari’ah supervisory boards as “specialised jurists, particularly in Islamic law 
and finance, entrusted with the duty of directing, reviewing and supervising the activities related to Islamic 
finance to ensure they comply with Shari’ah rules and principles” (Lahsasna 2010; p. 217). The SSB has 
both consultative and supervisory functions to support the board of directors.
5 Few Shari’ah scholars who are highly experienced in the inter-disciplines of Shari’ah law and finance 
(Alnasser and Muhammed 2012) do exist worldwide. Therefore, there is a limited number of the most 
prominent scholars dominate the Islamic banking industry nowadays (Mollah and Zaman 2015).
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two banking sectors may hold different perceptions of the oversight and resource-creation 
roles of outside boards depending on the banking business model employed and the struc-
ture of governance including the need for additional monitoring like Shari’ah governance. 
A lower firm valuation of board busyness in Islamic banks is predicted when compared to 
their conventional counterparts. This is justified by the extended agency conflicts and the 
unique business model of Islamic banking, which requires effective scrutiny from two dif-
ferent boards (i.e., the board of directors and the SSB).
We empirically examine whether board busyness is differently valued by investors 
engaging with the Islamic versus conventional banking sectors. We use an international 
sample of 386 bank-year observations for listed Islamic and conventional banks operat-
ing in 11 countries between 2010 and 2015. For the full sample (i.e., Islamic and conven-
tional banks), results show that busy board of directors is significantly associated with the 
high bank value. Conditional on the bank type, we find strong evidence of differential mar-
ket valuations of busy boards between Islamic and conventional banks. For conventional 
banks, investors tend to perceive board busyness as significantly increasing bank value. 
In contrast, investors in Islamic banks seem not to perceive board busyness, which reports 
insignificant results. We take a step ahead to study the channels underlying the board busy-
ness and bank value among the two bank types. Our empirical analyses involve studying 
agency conflicts and board compensation channels. We find that board busyness is likely to 
exacerbate agency conflicts within Islamic banks leading to lower market valuation. How-
ever, this is less pronounced in conventional banks. Furthermore, a busy board of directors 
is associated with low compensation pay-outs. This is more evidential in conventional than 
Islamic banks. It is also more expensive to appoint a busy SSB than non-busy SSB.
In additional analyses, board busyness becomes significantly perceived as reducing the 
Islamic bank value as the degree of board directorships increases. Moreover, Islamic banks 
with busy SSB exhibit significantly low market value. We also find an inverted U-shaped 
non-linear relationship between busy SSB and stock market valuation: at lower degrees of 
board busyness, investors tend to highly price busy SSB, yet at higher degrees of board 
busyness, the market value of Islamic banks decreases. Our results are robust in several 
model specifications (i.e., propensity score matching, first-differenced regressions and 
GMM) as well as alternative measures for board busyness and bank performance.
To our knowledge, this study is the first to offer comparative assessments between 
Islamic and conventional banking market valuations by utilising an important board attrib-
ute such as busyness. The study’s findings are timely to the current debate of the com-
plexity of corporate governance of Islamic versus conventional banking (e.g., Mollah and 
Zaman 2015; Mollah et al. 2017; Lassoued et al. 2017; Alandejani et al. 2017; Alqahtani 
et al. 2017; Elnahass et al. 2018). We extend prior literature studies through highlighting 
to the influence of institutional characteristics and governance structures on having distinct 
firm valuations for busy boards within the two banking sectors. This study also contributes 
to the stream of banking valuation studies in conventional banking (e.g., Caprio et al. 2007; 
Elyasiani and Zhang 2015) and identifies the possible preferential impacts of having a busy 
board. Moreover, results highlighting the adverse effects of SSB busyness on an Islamic 
bank value also add to a sizeable body of literature on corporate governance in Islamic 
banking discussing the importance of this board (e.g., Quttainah et al. 2013; Abdelsalam 
et al. 2016).
The findings in this study provide valuable policy implications to regulators and market 
participants involved in the two banking sectors. For conventional banks, board busyness 
offers reputational benefits to banks which tend to contribute to shareholder wealth maxi-
misation. However, such reputational benefits of busy boards tend not to hold in complex 
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agency environments and constrained business models like Islamic banking. Furthermore, 
findings suggest that effective Shari’ah monitoring seems to be an essential determinant 
for enhancing the market valuations of this banking sector. Our results suggest that market 
participants engaging with the Islamic banking sector tend to be more sensitive to the SSB 
busyness than the board of directors’ busyness. Having busy SSB seems to be negatively 
perceived by investors probably due to concerns related to the effectiveness of Shari’ah 
governance and moral accountability of the bank. Overall findings in this study raise a call 
to regulators and policymakers for the need to develop stricter criteria and guidelines to 
govern outside board directorships. The study also provides valuable insights to inform the 
debates raised by several external organisations regarding restrictions on the board multi-
ple-directorship (e.g., National Association of Corporate Directors 1996 and the Council of 
Institutional Investors-CII 2003).
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: the next section presents the background 
and theoretical framework. Section 3 discusses hypothesis development. Section 4 and 5 
present data and sample, and methodology, respectively. Section 6 reports empirical results 
while Sect. 7 provides additional testing. Section 8 presents the sensitivities and robustness 
checks. Finally, Sect. 9 concludes.
2  Background and theoretical framework
A board of directors (BOD) is responsible for approving a bank’s policies, procedures, 
and business strategies as well as resolving investor/manager agency conflicts by setting 
compensation, appointing, replacing and overseeing managers who cannot create value for 
investors. Strong governance implies an active role by boards in monitoring top manag-
ers, mitigating risks and enhancing long-term resilience all of which should be, in princi-
ple, positively priced by investors. This argument is in line with the Slack Resource the-
ory which suggests that firms with higher market valuation tend to have more economic 
resources to invest in the long-term improvements of their governance mechanisms and 
board monitoring quality. This investment will lead to future higher firm valuation, creat-
ing a virtuous circle (Pae and Choi 2011). However, entrenched managers may have incen-
tives to divert slack resources or free cash flows for their private interests (e.g., building 
an empire, increasing their compensation) (Jensen 1986). In such a case, those manag-
ers are less likely to use slack resources to invest in strengthening different governance 
mechanisms. Therefore, monitoring the effectiveness of outside directors for those manag-
ers becomes indispensable. Any reputational damage to the BODs, thus, could constitute a 
severe threat to the survival of the firm, and hence, have an adverse impact on the market 
valuations.
From an agency theory perspective, ineffective boards can exacerbate agency conflicts 
between investors and managers by encouraging managerial perquisites and private control 
benefits (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Chen 2016; Boateng et al. 2017; Harkin et al. 2019). 
As being financially independent of insiders, a board should have the ability to withstand 
pressure from their bank to manipulate earnings and monitor the operating process. Hence, 
appointing outside directors should in principle strengthen corporate governance to alle-
viate the shareholder/manager and controlling-shareholders/minority-shareholders agency 
conflicts (Choi et al. 2007; Machuga and Teitel 2009).
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Previous studies on firm valuation and value relevance6 (e.g., Ball et  al. 2003; Zoubi 
et al. 2016; Goncalves et al. 2017) document that the value relevance of accounting infor-
mation is important not only for investors but also for standard setters as it provides use-
ful insights into several accounting issues. Moreover, information on non-financial indica-
tors such as corporate governance mechanisms can still influence the ability of investors to 
price their firms and forecast future stock performance (Bose 2014; Yeh et al. 2015).
The empirical research on the relationship between governance and firm value suggests 
that well-governed firms are associated with a higher stock market valuation (e.g., Yer-
mack 1996; Gompers et  al. 2003; Sami et  al. 2011; de Haan and Vlahu 2013; Nguyen 
et al. 2015). Other sets of studies show that investors are likely to reward firms with effec-
tive governance by assigning a high firm value (see Epstein et al. 1994; Brown and Caylor 
2006; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 2007; Choi and Jung 2008; Baek et  al. 2009). Pae and 
Choi (2011) also state that investors often require a lower cost of equity for well-governed 
firms as these factors can mitigate agency costs and enhance disclosure transparency within 
firms. Caprio et al. (2007) study the effects of governance (i.e., ownership structure, share-
holder protection laws, cash flow rights, and empowering official supervisory and regula-
tory agencies) on the market valuations of banks. Similarly, Belkhir (2009) and Zulkafli 
et al. (2010) provide evidence on the relationship between bank value and governance (i.e., 
board characteristics, board size and CEO duality).
With the growing opaqueness surrounding the banking industry, research studies inves-
tigating the association between firm valuation and board busyness are still scarce. Only 
within the non-financial sector, studies have provided mixed evidence on the relationship 
between board busyness and firm value. For example, Fich and Shivdasani (2006) show for 
a sample of large US industrial firms (i.e., Forbes 500) that busy outside directors might 
not be effective monitors on any board, and hence, negatively affect market-to-book ratios 
and governance. Cashman et al. (2012) also find that the presence of busy directors has a 
negative impact on market value, but only of large firms (i.e., S&P 500). Contrary, Perry 
and Peyer (2005) find that outside directorships for executives are likely to enhance firm 
value, possibly through either external networking opportunities or through signalling of 
high quality for the managerial decision-making process. They argue that outside director-
ships only negatively affect market valuations when the firm has high agency problems. 
Furthermore, Ferris et al. (2003) find no evidence that multiple directorships can shirk their 
responsibilities to serve on board committees and suggest an insignificant linkage between 
multiple directorships and the likelihood of securities fraud litigation.
Investigating the board busyness attribute emerges from two opposing perspectives. 
The first one is the busyness view which contends that busy outside directors may fail in 
fulfilling their monitoring role as they are sitting on many boards and are likely to have 
relatively less time available to collect/process information that would support business 
strategies (Hart 1995; Jackling and Johl 2009). Busy outside directors tend to be less effec-
tive to monitor and control managerial opportunism, unlikely to provide thoughtful advice 
to executives, and, therefore, board busyness is expected to be detrimental to firms in the 
long-term (Falato et al. 2014; Zhang 2016). Therefore, board busyness is associated with 
weak governance structures (Core et al. 1999). As weak governance structure is perceived 
by market participants leading to low market valuations, market participants are more 
6 Value relevance is defined as the ability of an accounting measure to capture and summarise information 
that affects the firm value. This measure is significantly associated with a set of information used by inves-
tors in a firm’s valuation such as share prices, stock returns, or market capitalisation (Barth et al. 2001).
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likely to penalise their firms for poor monitoring (Core et al. 1999; Fich and Shivdasani 
2006).
The second view is the reputational benefits emerging from appointing a busy board. 
Board busyness is associated with high popularity and reputational capital in the external 
labour market (Masulis and Mobbs 2014). Holding multiple board seats can also improve 
a board member experience, objectiveness, and proficiency in evaluating and overseeing 
the managers’ decisions (Harris and Shimizu 2004; Brennan et al. 2016). Arguably, their 
social ties make them excellent advisors and value-enhancing directors (Field et al. 2013). 
Busy directors thus can be assessed as valuable assets for their firms given their extensive 
and updated industry-specific knowledge. This board can, hence, offer a vital supportive 
role to inside directors (Clifford et al. 2017) as well as have established outside networks 
that could facilitate access to market sources and other strategic benefits. These reputa-
tional benefits can be positively priced by investors, and board busyness can be perceived 
as value-enhancing for a firm (Muravyev et al. 2016).
Moreover, in line with the signalling theory, holding information content constant, firm 
valuations may depend on how information is categorised and presented (Peng and Xiong 
2006). The extent of disclosure, reporting transparency, and news outcomes signal good 
news on favourable aspects related to financial and corporate information which in turn 
might lead to stock price over-valuing. Under a transactional setting, when an investor is 
considering purchasing stock from a listed firm, this firm might be interested in signalling 
the hidden value of the equity investment (Allen and Faulhaber 1989) or reporting exten-
sive corporate information relating to strong governance mechanisms including effective 
BODs (Higgins and Gulati 2006). Conveying information on strong corporate governance 
to stakeholders eliminates the information asymmetry between firm managers and inves-
tors (e.g., Ballas et al. 2012; Bergh et al. 2014; Mitra et al. 2019).
3  Hypothesis development
With the lack of evidence related to the possible effect of board busyness on stock market 
valuations of banks in general terms, additional research gaps emerge which particularly 
pertain to studying this effect within different bank types (i.e., Islamic and conventional 
banks). Based on the two distinct contradicting views of the busy board discussed above 
(i.e., the busyness versus reputational effects) and the limited evidence within the banking 
setting, we conjecture that board busyness can have either positive or negative implications 
on stock market valuations. However, the direction of the association will be ultimately 
conditional on the system of corporate governance employed, the levels of the agency costs 
and the banking business model, all of which could vary depending on the bank type.
3.1  Market valuations of busy board of directors in Islamic and conventional banks
Islamic banks are distinguished from conventional banks by several aspects of their busi-
ness models. Unlike conventional banks, depositors/investors in Islamic banks have no 
right to intervene in the financial and operating management of their funds (Abdel Karim 
2001). Therefore, managers in Islamic banks have full control of the investment process 
of depositors’ funds which offer several opportunities to pursue their own benefits at the 
expense of their investors, which can result in investors carrying additional agency costs 
(Abdelsalam et al. 2016). Moreover, additional agency costs arise in Islamic banking given 
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those outside directors who are expert in Shari’ah legitimacy are scarce worldwide, and 
there are few numbers of prominent and expert outside directors who dominate the Islamic 
banking industry.
In Islamic banking, board busyness can reduce the monitoring ability of outside direc-
tors to effectively mitigate and prevent wealth expropriation from minority shareholders 
which could lead to substantial agency costs. Such expectation can be attributed to the 
limited time and attention given by busy outside directors to scrutinise the bank’s opera-
tions against risky and opportunistic activities/transactions, which is strictly impermissible 
according to the Shari’ah governance. Furthermore, operating on a constrained banking 
model might lead investors’ uncertainty regarding the streams of future cash flows which 
must be invested in compliance with the Shari’ah rules. Poor monitoring by busy boards 
can further destroy the trust of investors with regards to managers’ discretion and expropri-
ation of rents (e.g., Caprio et al. 2007). Therefore, investors may anticipate that additional 
cash flow might be diverted, and a smaller portion of the firm’s profits will be paid off as 
dividends (La Porta et al. 2002).
In contrast, conventional banks operate on a relatively less complex business model 
which facilitate alternative investment channels, quick access to market sources and risk 
diversifications through trading in financial instruments which are prohibited by Islamic 
banks (e.g., derivatives and options). Therefore, the various reputational benefits associ-
ated with board busyness are more likely to be available and pervasive for conventional 
banking to enhance the bank equity value, when compared to Islamic banking. Signalling 
such reputational effects to the stock market is expected to affect investors’ perceptions of 
board busyness positively. Moreover, in line with the representativeness heuristic theory, 
individuals are likely to overestimate “the probability of an event based on the similarity 
between its properties and the parent population’s properties”; for example, comparing the 
firm position with its competitors using several benchmark indicators (Chan et  al. 2004, 
p.5). For a conventional bank that appoints outside directors who serve in many banks, 
investors may overestimate the probability that these directors are more knowledgeable/
reputable and might also overestimate the fact that busy independent directors are certified 
as effective monitors of the banking operations and, hence, investors could anticipate sub-
sequently high returns and high firm value.
Accordingly, published information on board busyness in Islamic banking is expected 
to signal to the stock market weak systems of governance and/or increased cost of equity 
due to high information risk. Investors are expected to perceive board busyness as leading 
to ineffective monitoring quality and may request higher rewards for the possibly arising 
risks, suggesting lower stock price multiples in Islamic banks when compared to their con-
ventional counterparts. This prediction is in line with the good management theory (Jamali 
et al. 2008; Pae and Choi 2011) which states that a positive relationship between low-qual-
ity monitoring by boards and the provision of low-quality corporate-level information. This 
relation is likely to be pervasive when operating under opaque/complex business models. 
This leads to the following hypothesis, stated in the alternative form:
H1: Board busyness is significantly and highly valued by conventional banks’ when com-
pared to Islamic banks’ investors.
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3.2  Market valuations of busy SSB in Islamic banks
Islamic banks operate on a double governance mechanism (i.e., BODs and SSB). The pres-
ence of an extra layer of governance (i.e., SSB) could serve as an effective mechanism 
to monitor Islamic banks’ prioritisation of religious norms. The SSB’s primary role is 
to ensure Shari’ah compliance and minimise reputation risk, which may result in capital 
erosion among Islamic banks as well as in lawsuits by fund providers (Archer and Karim 
2007). Members of this board also serve as the counterparts of conventional internal audi-
tors who enhance the creditability and reliability of published financial and non-financial 
information in the stock market (Godlewski et al. 2016). Therefore, Shari’ah governance is 
expected to promote investors’ trust and confidence about the quality of published infor-
mation by Islamic banks, who are presumably targeting investments and trades incorpo-
rate ethical and moral criteria (O’Sullivan 1996; Pomeranz 1997). Therefore, investment 
choices and stock price valuations are likely to be influenced by the outcomes of the 
screening process as well as decisions made by the SSB on the quality and sufficiency 
of the corporate information published by Islamic banks in compliance with the Shari’ah 
laws.
To date, a limited number of Shari’ah advisors engage excessively in Islamic banks’ 
activities by sitting on many SSBs for banks operating globally (Wilson 2009; Godlewski 
et al. 2016). Reuters (2012) reports that the top 20 Shari’ah scholars hold about 55% of all 
board positions worldwide, and some scholars are much more in demand than others. As 
such, busy SSB can adversely affect Islamic bank investors’ valuation in two ways. First, 
given the high concentration of the workload undertaken by a small group of Shari’ah 
experts and the fact that SSBs’ performance is not regularly evaluated by the BODs (Mol-
lah and Zaman 2015), SSB is expected to be less effective in their Shari’ah monitoring as 
a result of this such board busyness. This might signal a weak Shari’ah governance to the 
stock market and hence, reduce the bank value. Second, the scarcity and high reputation of 
Shari’ah scholars suggest that they might be expensive to appoint because their appoint-
ment reflects higher charges of salaries and remunerations which will have substantial 
implications on the bank financial performance leading to lower investor valuations. Prior 
studies suggest that expensive appoints of boards implies low-cost efficiency and poor firm 
performance (see Linn and Park 2005; Brick et al. 2006). This will in fact, directly affect 
the cost of equity and relative firm valuations in stock markets (Renneboog and Trojanow-
ski 2011). In line with the Equity theory (Dah and Frye 2017), multiple directorships are 
associated with board entrenchment caused by the over-payment for those members.7
Accordingly, we conjecture that SSB busyness is likely to signal weak Shari’ah govern-
ance and low bank performance to the stock market leading to low market valuations for 
Islamic banks. This leads to the following hypothesis, stated in the alternative form:
H2: Islamic banks’ investors negatively value busy SSB.
7 The equity theory anticipates the reaction of individuals towards over- or under-reward situations. Specifi-
cally, directors make subjective assessments of the ratio of their efforts (input) and compensation (output) 
to those of other referents. They may experience dissonance if their perceived ratio is unequal to that of 
referents. Consequently, they often reduce their efforts or try to push their compensation to obtain a similar 
ratio to salient other referents.
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4  Data and sample
The consolidated financial data (in U.S. dollars) are collected from DataStream, 
Bankscope, Thomson One Reuters, and Bloomberg databases. We hand-collected the gov-
ernance data for outside directors, Shari’ah advisors and board information from banks’ 
annual reports, corporate filings (e.g., security prospectuses or governance reports) and 
websites. We excluded grey directors who have personal and economic ties with the bank 
and management (Hsu and Wu, 2014). We followed Field et  al. (2013), Fich and Shiv-
dasani (2006) and Chakravarty and Rutherford (2017) to count for the number of direc-
torships held by directors in all for-profit private and public firms. In other words, we 
excluded directorships related to activities in sports clubs, non-for-profit, trusts and chari-
table institutions.8 Country macroeconomics/governance indicators are retrieved from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators database.
We study listed Islamic and conventional banks in global stock markets for the period 
2010–2015. The selected period allows us to avoid the potential impact of the global finan-
cial crisis shock of 2007–2009. The initial sample comprises a total of 3038 banks (196 
Islamic banks and 2842 conventional banks) in 36 countries. In line with prior banking 
studies (e.g., Beck et al. 2013; Alqahtani et al. 2017; Mollah et al. 2017), we applied the 
following four criteria to filter the sample: (1) The countries with both types of banks have 
at least two listed banks; (2) the banks have annual reports (official websites), which are 
published as of 31 December; (3) The full-service investment banks and banks with Islamic 
windows were dropped from the sample9; and (4) The banks must have at least three con-
secutive years’ full data availability. Our final sample is an unbalanced panel data set cov-
ering 70 listed commercial banks (386 bank-year observations) operating in 11 countries. 
Countries such as Malaysia and Turkey, where Islamic banks have a significant share of the 
total banking industry, have been excluded from the sample as most Islamic banks are not 
listed as separated entities on the stock markets (Saeed and Izzeldin 2016).
Table  1 presents the sample distribution by country and bank, with 27 listed Islamic 
banks (150 bank-year observations) and 43 listed conventional banks (236 bank-year 
observations). The percentage of bank representations is our sample for Islamic banks and 
conventional banks are reported as 38.9% and 61.1% respectively. The highest concentra-
tion of Islamic banks is found in Bahrain while Indonesia reports the highest level of con-
ventional banks.
8 For example, the 2014’s annual report of Albarala Banking Group in Bahrain indicates the profile of Mr 
Abdulla Saleh Kamel (Vice Chairman of the board of directors) that is “…Mr. Abdulla Kamel has also 
been and remains very active in public and charitable activities through his membership of many inter-
national and local organizations and associations, such as Jeddah Chamber of Commerce (twice as Board 
Member), Young Presidents’ Organization, Friends of Saudi Arabia, The Centennial Fund and the Board of 
Trustees of the Prince of Wales Business Leaders Forum.” (Page 11).
9 We refer to conventional banks with Islamic windows as banks with an independent department which 
provides Islamic products with an SSB (Elnahass et al. 2014). Our sample, following the studies of Elna-
hass et  al. (2014, 2018) and Johnes et  al. (2014), excludes those banks because supervisory issues and 
accountancy requirements are expected to be different to those of full-ledged Islamic banks (Islamic Finan-
cial Services Board 2005).
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5  Methodology
5.1  Measures of the bank market value
Consistent with the prior literature, we measure the bank market value through a firm-
level market measure which is the Tobin’s q (hereafter, lnQ) (e.g., Cheng et al. 2008; 
Ammann et  al. 2011; Cashman et  al. 2012; Black et  al. 2015; Gyapong et  al. 2016; 
Muravyev et al. 2016). lnQ is a forward-looking approximation of firm value that cap-
tures the value of intangible corporate resources (e.g., goodwill and trust from good 
board structure). It is estimated as the sum of a bank year-end book value of debt and 
market value of equity, divided by its year-end book value of total assets. The market 
value of equity is computed as the end-year number of outstanding shares multiplied by 
the stock prices (e.g., Busch and Hoffmann 2011; Cashman et al. 2012; Gyapong et al. 
2016). Following previous studies (e.g., Black et  al. 2012), we take the natural loga-
rithm of Tobin’s q to mitigate the impact of high-q outlier banks.
The selection of this measure is justified for several reasons. First, we aim to inves-
tigate the long-term firm valuations of boards’ busyness. Therefore, unlike other short-
term accounting performance measures such as return on assets (ROA) or return on 
equity (ROE), lnQ offers long-term market valuations for a firm (e.g., Bhagat and Black 
2001; Thomas and Eden 2004; Sami et  al. 2011). Second, relative to lnQ, ROA and 
ROE are likely to be subject to possible and direct earnings manipulation by manage-
ment (Gyapong et  al. 2016). Moreover, this measure combines the market with book 
values of the bank equity, distortions from tax laws and accounting conventions are 
minimised (Wernerfelt and Montgomery 1988). Finally, lnQ is commonly known as one 
of the standard dependent variables in firm value research within the context of corpo-
rate governance (Fich and Shivdasani 2006; Black et al. 2012, 2014).
5.2  Measures of board busyness
We define a busy board member (i.e., either BODs or SSB) as an individual who holds, 
at least, two outside directorships (e.g., Ferris et  al. 2003; Fich and Shivdasani 2006; 
Cashman et al. 2012). Based on this and following Falato et al. (2014), Elyasiani and 
Zhang (2015), and Chou and Feng (2018), we use a standard measure of board busy-
ness which is the percentage of busy outside directors (%BBOD) and busy Shari’ah 
scholars (%BSSB). The %BBOD is calculated as the number of outside directors serv-
ing on two or more outside firms divided by the number of outside directors on the 
board. The %BSSB is defined as the number of Shari’ah advisors serving on at least two 
outside organisations divided by the number of Shari’ah advisors on the board. Using 
the percentage of board busyness provides a plausible assessment of the board advis-
ing and monitoring intensity under the assumption of high independence, substantial 
contributions in the firm strategic decisions and their sound reputation maintained in 
the industry (Fich and Shivdasani 2006). The higher percentage of busy outside direc-
tors/Shari’ah advisors, the higher the level of busyness of BOD/SSB which influences 
the monitoring quality of overall board (Ferris et al. 2003; Chakravarty and Rutherford 
2017). Moreover, we focus on outside directors because they are primarily responsible 
for scrutinising managers while insiders are potentially on BOD for many other reasons 
(Cashman et al. 2012).
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5.3  Empirical models
Banks are likely to differ in the opportunities and challenges that they may encounter over 
the years due to the peculiar nature of their sector. This can lead to a situation where dis-
closure of board directorships, other board characteristics and bank market value are jointly 
and dynamically determined by unobserved bank-specific variables (e.g., quality and style 
of management, business strategy, market perception and bank complexity) (Henry 2008; 
Guest 2009), which pooled ordinary least square (OLS) estimation may detect and con-
trol (Kraatz and Zajac 2001; Wooldridge 2002). Therefore, we employ panel data estima-
tions to mitigate endogeneity problems arising from potential unobserved bank-specific 
heterogeneity (e.g., Henry 2008; Guest 2009). Although better governance practices of a 
firm can enhance its profitability position, investors’ valuation may only be capturing the 
high profitability performance rather than perceiving the specific board busyness attrib-
ute. To overcome possible misinterpretations of the investors’ firm valuations, we include a 
comprehensive set of control variables to mitigate omitted-variable bias as well as utilised 
three-stage least-square (3SLS) estimations with instrumental variables (IVs) (e.g., Bhagat 
and Black 2001; Coles et al. 2008; Faleye et al. 2011) to mitigate the endogeneity between 
busy boards and bank valuation.10
The choice of valid IVs implies a correlation with the endogenous variable, and not 
with the error terms of the dependent variable11 (Elyasiani and Jia 2008). Consistent with 
Elyasiani and Zhang (2015), we use the number of public firms headquartered in the same 
country of the bank as our first IVs (source: World Bank). We contend that outside direc-
tors of the bank headquartered in countries with more public firms are more likely to find 
additional jobs in other companies. We, therefore, expect that the number of busy outside 
directors is positively related to the number of public firms headquartered in the same 
country. The other IVs employed for board busyness is the country-level income generat-
ing category (Source: World Bank). This variable takes a value of 1 if the “home” bank is 
in a middle and high-income generating nation, and 0 otherwise.12 We argue that direc-
tors of banks headquartered in the high-income countries with more skill-job opportunities 
are more likely to find director positions in other institutions (Goldberg and Pavcnik 2007; 
World Bank 2016). This might positively affect the number of the directorships by outside 
boards.
Both IVs are correlated with possible endogenous variables (i.e., %BBOD; %BSSB) and 
should predict stock market valuations only indirectly, through their effects on endogenous 
variables (see Black et al. 2006). Indeed, in our study setting and sampled banks, those IVs 
can indirectly affect bank valuations because the country-level indicators are less likely to 
10 The Wu-Hausman endogeneity test (e.g., Wu 1973; Hausman 1978) statistics reveal the presence of 
endogeneity biases.
11 Two diagnostic tests are performed to examine both IVs’ and the specification of our system equations’ 
validity. First, we present the Sargan test which shows the misspecification test with the null hypothesis of 
no misspecification. We then report the second test (Breusch and Pagan LM) to investigate whether cross-
equation disturbances are truly related and if the equations will need to be tested simultaneously. These 
statistics suggest that both IVs theoretically and statistically satisfy the necessary conditions for validity 
and relevance, and thus, findings obtained by 3SLS is more consistent and efficient than those of traditional 
pooled OLS.
12 World Bank (2015) classifies countries as middle and high income if their Gross National Income (GNI) 
per capita is more than $1045. By contrast, countries are categorised as low-income if their GNI per capita 
is $1045 or less in 2014.
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influence Tobin’s q endogenously. We, accordingly, specify the simultaneous models as 
follows:
where lnQit represents the natural logarithm of Tobin’s q for bank i at time t; %BBOD rep-
resents the percentage of busy outside directors; ϕP is a vector of control variables in the 
bank valuation model. εit is the error term.
Our control variables include board size (LnBSIZE) to control for the boards’ role and 
effectiveness. This variable is calculated by the natural logarithm of the number of board 
members (Cheng et  al. 2008; Mollah and Zaman 2015; Faleye and Krishnan 2017). We 
further control for the board independence (%INDEP), which is measured by the percent-
age of outside non-executive directors on board, respectively (Cashman et  al. 2012; Li 
2014; Boateng et al. 2017; DeBoskey et al. 2019). We also control for bank size (LogTA) 
by using the natural logarithm of total assets measured in thousands of USD of a bank at 
the end of the fiscal year (Black et al. 2012; Chen et al. 2018). We also include financial 
leverage (LEV), measured by the ratio of total liability over total equity, because leverage 
can affect lnQ through tax benefits and mitigation of free cash flow problems (Black et al. 
2012; Cheng et al. 2006; Black and Kim 2012). We also control for Big4 auditor (BIG4) 
taking a value of 1 when the bank has a big4 auditor and 0 otherwise (Mollah and Zaman 
2015). We further follow the prior research on governance (e.g., Aggarwal et  al. 2009; 
Ammann et al. 2011; Luo and Hachiya 2005) to control for the ratio of cash to total assets 
(CASH/ASSETS) and the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets (CAPEX/ASSETS). Fol-
lowing Mollah et al. (2017) and Chang et al. (2018), we control for the possible effect of 
banking sector concentration on value by using the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI).
Moreover, we control for differences in economic development across countries by add-
ing the GDP per capita (GDPCAPITA). We finally capture between-country differences 
in governance perceptions by introducing a country governance index (COUNTRY_GOV) 
(Kaufmann et al. 2005; Čihák and Hesse 2010). This variable is estimated as the average 
of six governance measures including the regulatory quality, the rule of law, control of cor-
ruption, political stability, governance effectiveness, and the voice and accountability. This 
index captures cross-country differences in institutional developments that are expected to 
have an impact on banking market value. We predict that investors are more likely to invest 
their capital in the stock market in countries with higher COUNTRY_GOV. In other words, 
the higher the index, the higher the bank value.
We control for both year and bank fixed effects in all models. For the treatment of the 
outliers, we winsorise each variable in our test models at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
Table 2 presents variable definitions and notations in our estimated models.
5.4  Descriptive statistics
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for the full sample and the banks’ subsamples of 
Islamic banks (IBs) and conventional banks (CBs). With regards to the bank market value, 
we find that IBs report a higher mean of lnQ (0.259) than that of CBs (0.220). However, 
the two-sample t test shows an insignificant difference between these two sub-samples. For 
the governance indicators, the full sample reports an average level of board busyness which 
is 48% for the BODs (%BBOD). IBs show a lower mean of %BBOD of 43% while CBs 
report 51%, t test show significant mean differences between the two bank types’ board 
(1)lnQit = 훽0 + 훽1%BBODit + 휙P + 휇Year effects + 휋Bank effects + 휀it
(2)%BBODit = 훽0 + 훽1lnQit + 휙P + 휇Year effects + 휋Bank effects + 휀it
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busyness. For SSB busyness (%BSSB), the IBs subsample reports that SSB has a substan-
tially high level of busyness with a mean of 77.78%. Moreover, IBs show significantly 
larger board size (11 directors) relative to CBs (9 directors). For board independence, on 
average, IBs (CBs) report 33% (36%) respectively, with an insignificant difference between 
the two bank types.
Consistent with prior literature (e.g., Elnahass et al. 2018), our finding suggests that IBs 
are significantly smaller in firm size (LogTA) than CBs. Finally, we find that IBs have sig-
nificantly higher cash to total assets ratio (CASH/ASSETS) than CBs. This result indicates 
that IBs are more likely to hold cash in response to the arising liquidity management chal-
lenges under their constrained banking model.
We present the Pearson pair-wise correlation matrix of all independent variables for 
both sub-samples of IBs and CBs in Table 4 (Panel A and B). The results show accepted 
correlation coefficients (i.e., smaller than 0.8), which suggest that there are no serious con-
cerns for multicollinearity. This is also supported by the unreported low individual VIF 
values (< 10), low means of VIFs (< 6) and low condition numbers (< 15) for all the test 
variables.
6  Empirical results
6.1  Market valuations of busy boards of directors in Islamic and conventional 
banks
Table  5 reports the three-stage least square (3SLS) estimations examining the effect of 
board busyness on market valuations for the full sample (Panel A), IBs (Panel B, BOD: 
column 1; and SSB: column 2) and CBs (Panel C) subsamples.
For the full sample, in Panel A, the coefficient on BOD busyness (%BBOD) is signif-
icantly and positively associated with lnQ. This implies that investors, on average, per-
ceive board busyness as value-enhancing board attribute that increases bank valuations. 
This result is in line with, both, the resource dependence and signalling theories suggesting 
that outside directors serving on many boards can promote strong governance and bring 
strategic resources (e.g., extended industry knowledge, expertise and access to market 
sources) to their firms and hence, positively valued by investors. With respect to the con-
trol variables, board size (LogBSIZE) shows a negative and significant coefficient, which 
is consistent with prior evidence predicting that small boards tend to perform more effec-
tively than large boards (e.g., Yermack 1996; Eisenberg et  al. 1998; Abbott et  al. 2004; 
Gyapong et al. 2016).13 The coefficient on board independence (%INDEP) is negative and 
significant which suggests that more outside directors serving on many boards are associ-
ated with lower firm valuations (Ararat et al. 2010; Black et al. 2012). Moreover, higher 
cash reserves tend to be associated with lower market valuations, as represented by the 
negative and significant coefficient on CASH/ASSETS ratios. These findings are in line with 
Ammann et al. (2011). Results further show negative associations between lnQ and BIG4. 
The low valuation for Big4 firms might be attributable to investors’ perception that Big 4 is 
13 Having a small board associated with high financial ratios (e.g., profitability and operating efficiency) 
and better CEO compensation. As a result, some empirical evidence (e.g., Kini et al. 1995; Yermack 1996) 
indicate that small boards are preferred by institutional investors, dissident directors and corporate raiders.
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either more expensive to appoint (Craswell et al. 2002) or offer similar quality of assurance 
services to those provided by non-Big4 firms (Lawrence et al. 2010). Finally, the signifi-
cant and positive coefficient on COUNTRY_GOV suggests that higher country governance 
is associated with investors’ valuations.
Table 5  Boards busyness and bank valuation—within Islamic and conventional banks
The table presents three-stage least-square (3SLS) results for the full sample (Panel A), Islamic bank sub-
sample (Panel B) and conventional bank subsample (Panel C) identifying the effect of busy board of direc-
tors or busy SSB on a bank’s firm value. We build simultaneous equations models
lnQit = 훽0 + 훽1%BBODit + 휙P + 휇Year effects + 휋Bank effects + 휀it
%BBODit = 훽0 + 훽1lnQit + 휙P + 휇Year effects + 휋Bank effects + 휀it
Where, ϕP is a vector of control variables in the bank valuation model including bank-level indicators, 
country-level indicators, and country governance indicators. Models are tested for the period of 6-year from 
2010. The diagnostic tests show that LM statistics p value is less than 1% and Sargan test p value is greater 
than 10% across all models, indicating that the chosen IVs for board of directors’ busyness are valid and the 
models are not over-identified
p values in parentheses, *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. ISLAMIC is a dummy indicator for Islamic 
banks which takes the value of 1 if the bank is Islamic, 0 for conventional banks. See Table 2 for other vari-
able definitions
Variables Panel A: Full sam-
ple (IBs and CBs 
together)
Panel B: Islamic banks (IBs) Panel C: Conven-
tional banks (CBs)
lnQ
(1)
lnQ
(2)
lnQ
(3)
lnQ
(4)
%BBOD 2.950*** (0.000) 0.285 (0.109) 0.427 (0.104) 1.826*** (0.000)
%BSSB − 1.365*** (0.007)
LogBSIZE − 0.391*** (0.004) − 0.117* (0.096) − 0.159* (0.084) 0.152 (0.192)
INDEP − 1.006*** (0.000) − 0.233*** (0.004) − 0.347*** (0.004) − 0.786*** (0.000)
LogTA 0.048 (0.643) 0.048* (0.087) 0.129** (0.050) − 0.278*** (0.003)
CAPEX/ASSETS 0.003 (0.561) 0.002 (0.420) 0.005 (0.100) − 0.002 (0.745)
CASH/ASSETS − 2.045*** (0.000) − 0.713*** (0.007) − 0.673** (0.036) − 1.349*** (0.007)
LEV − 0.004 (0.719) 0.012** (0.049) 0.017** (0.047) 0.010 (0.405)
BIG4 − 0.617*** (0.002) − 0.147* (0.094) − 0.223* (0.094) − 0.333*** (0.009)
HHI 0.446 (0.125) − 0.015 (0.869) 0.177 (0.190) 0.524 (0.131)
GDPCAPITA − 0.014*** (0.005) 0.005** (0.011) 0.003 (0.339) − 0.008** (0.040)
COUNTRY_GOV 0.496** (0.033) − 0.028 (0.812) 0.042 (0.777) 0.395** (0.034)
ISLAMIC 0.091 (0.735)
Constant 0.465 (0.769) − 0.350 (0.581) − 0.247 (0.808) 3.379** (0.025)
Year fixed effect YES YES YES YES
Bank fixed effect YES YES YES YES
Observations 386 150 150 236
Adjusted  R2 0.748 0.994 0.990 0.882
Chi2
LM statistics (p 
value)
Sargan test (p value)
3164***
0.000
0.414
2645***
0.046
0.151
1423***
0.000
0.199
4480***
0.000
0.376
%BBOD = %BSSB 
(F-test)
0.000
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When examining the effect of the BOD busyness across the two bank types, in Table 5, 
we find insignificant evidence for the effect of busy outside directors on the market valu-
ations for IBs (in Panel B, column 1). This implies that investors in IBs seem not to price 
board busyness. For CBs (in Panel C), we find a positive association between %BBOD and 
lnQ, suggesting that investors in CBs tend to perceive board busyness increases the firm 
value significantly. The coefficient of busy BOD in CBs is also economically significant, 
as a one per cent increase in board busyness reflects an increase in the bank value by 182.6 
per cent. Results for the controls across the two bank types are generally consistent with 
the main findings of the full sample. However, we find a positive association between the 
bank size (LogTA) and lnQ for IBs, which implies that large IBs are more likely to experi-
ence higher market valuation than small IBs. The result may be justified by large IBs main-
tain higher quality financial reporting and stronger governance mechanisms. In contrast, 
such a relationship is significantly negative in CBs, indicating lower pricing by investors of 
CBs for larger banks. These findings are consistent with prior studies (Elnahass et al. 2014, 
2018).
Taken together, our findings show that board busyness has a differential effect on the 
market valuations across both bank types. Busy board increases the market valuations for 
CBs with no significant evidence for IBs which is in line with our prediction and supports 
our first hypothesis H1. The positive effect of board busyness on the market valuations of 
CBs indicates that some reputational benefits are likely to dominate investors’ expecta-
tions. The emerging reputational benefits from board busyness seem to alleviate investors’ 
uncertainty related to ineffective monitoring and agency conflicts between investors and 
bank managers. This, in turn, leads to high market valuations. Our finding is consistent 
with prior literature within the industrial sector settings (e.g., Ammann et al. 2011; Field 
et al. 2013; Clifford et al. 2017). The absence of market valuations for IBs can be justified 
through the signalling theory. Investors in IBs seem to be well informed about the impor-
tance of effective monitoring as well as the relative implications of poor Shari’ah govern-
ance. These findings suggest that investors seem to be sceptical of board busyness and 
penalise IBs by not valuing busy outside directors, which is in line with the busyness view.
6.2  Market valuations of busy SSB in Islamic banks
We extend our analyses to test H2 expecting negative market valuations for busy SSB in 
IBs. In Table  5 (Panel B, column 2), results show a negative and significant coefficient 
on %BSSB which suggests that SSB busyness reduces bank value. The coefficient on SSB 
busyness is also economically significant; one per cent increase in SSB busyness, on aver-
age, is associated with a decrease in the market value of IBs by 136.5 per cent. Results for 
other control variables remain qualitatively unchanged. Busy BODs show an insignificant 
impact on IBs valuations consistently. To examine whether there is a significant difference 
between the two-board busyness (BOD versus SSB) results, we compare the coefficients 
on %BBOD and %BSSB. The reported F-test (i.e., Wald test) indicates that the two coef-
ficients are statistically different.
Overall findings imply that investors seem to discount the value of IBs appointing busy 
SSB possibly because such busyness could jeopardise their responsibilities and commit-
ments in screening out the bank activities/transactions to emphasis on their Shari’ah com-
pliance. Moreover, investors seem to differentially perceive busyness of SSB and BOD, 
placing substantial valuation for busy SSB only. This might be justified by the relative high 
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trust and confidence that effective Shari’ah monitoring could have in preserving the reli-
gious/ethical orientation of this banking sector (Elnahass et al. 2018).
7  Additional testing
7.1  Tests for the effect of busy boards on bank agency relationships
High market valuations in banking are likely to be affected by the level of agency costs. 
Board busyness could exacerbate agency costs because a busy board will have less time, 
effort and attention to fulfil their roles and to effectively monitor which could affect market 
valuations. In this section, we additionally examine whether busy BOD can either dimin-
ish or exacerbate bank agency costs across IBs and CBs. To do so, we build simultaneous 
equation models, which are specified in Eq. 3 and 4 as bellows:
where CASH/ASSETSit represents bank agency relationships, measured by the ratio of cash 
to total assets (see Farag et al. 2018) and a higher ratio indicates more agency costs. We 
include a comprehensive set of controls which can explain for the firm agency costs, such 
as board size (LogBSIZE), board independence (%INDEP), firm size (LogTA), firm age 
(LogAge), firm risk-taking (LogZscore), and firm profitability (ROAA) computed by the 
ratio of net income to average total assets. GDP per capita (GDPCAPITA) and country 
governance index (COUNTRY_GOV). For IBs subsample, we also include SSB busyness 
(%BSSB) and SSB size (LogSSBSize) measured by the natural logarithm of the number of 
Shari’ah scholars serving on SSB. This is consistent with Farag et al. (2018).
Table 6 (Panel A and B) shows that there are differential impacts of board busyness on 
agency costs across IBs and CBs. Conditional on the bank type, busy BOD is significantly 
and negatively associated with agency costs in CBs (i.e., lower agency costs). IBs show 
significantly high agency costs associated with busy boards. This can be attributable to 
the constrained business model of IBs which requires extended monitoring to protect the 
minority rights of investment account holders/depositors’ who engage with the bank under 
the profit and loss sharing arrangements. Therefore, BOD busyness is less likely to reduce 
the agency conflicts within this bank model.
Furthermore, in Table 6 (Panel A), we find that %BSSB has a positive and significant 
relationship with CASH/ASSETS. This confirms that the agency conflicts within IBs are 
also severe when those banks employ a busy SSB member(s). Therefore, lower market val-
uations for IBs can be partly explained by higher agency costs arising from appointing a 
busy SSB. The reported F-test (i.e., Wald test) shows that the coefficients of %BBOD and 
%BSSB are statistically differential.
7.2  Tests for the influence of boards compensation on busyness
In the main result section, we argued that the scarcity and high reputation of Shari’ah 
scholars would imply that they are expensive to appoint and could result in lower cost 
(3)
CASH∕ASSETSit = 훽0 + 훽1%BBODit + 휙P + 휇Year effects + 휋Bank effects + 휀it
(4)
%BBODit = 훽0 + 훽1CASH∕ASSETSit + 휙P + 휇Year effects + 휋Bank effects + 휀it
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efficiencies. To examine this argument, we conduct additional examinations for the 
effects of the BODs/SSBs compensation on their busyness for both IBs and CBs. The 
compensation variable is defined as the ratio of board total compensation (i.e., the sum 
of annual directors’ fixed fees like salaries, meeting and committee fees, bonus, and 
in-kind benefits) to the firm’s net income (see Jensen and Murphy, 1990). Our regres-
sions models employ OLS with robust standard errors and specified in Eqs. 5 and 6 as 
follows:
where BODC/NIit represents the ratio of BOD compensation to net income. SSBC/NIit rep-
resents the ratio of SSB compensation to net income. Control variables include LogBSIZE, 
(5)%BBODit = 훽0 + 훽1BODC∕NIit + 휙P + 휇Year effects + 휀it
(6)%BSSBit = 훽0 + 훽1SSBC∕NIit + 휙P + 휇Year effects + 휀it
Table 6  The effects of boards busyness on agency relationships—within Islamic and conventional banks
This table reports the 3SLS estimation results on the effect of the busy boards (busy BOD and/or busy SSB) 
on bank agency costs for Islamic banks (Panel A) and conventional banks (Panel B). Our model is specified 
as follows
CASH∕ASSETSit = 훽0 + 훽1%BBODit + 휙P + 휇Year effects + 휋Bank effects + 휀it
%BBODit = 훽0 + 훽1CASH∕ASSETSit + 휙P + 휇Year effects + 휋Bank effects + 휀it
Where CASH/ASSETSit represents agency costs within banks, which is calculated by the ratio of cash 
divided by total assets
p values in parentheses, *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. See Table 2 for variable definitions
Variables Panel A: Islamic banks (IBs) Panel B: Conven-
tional banks (CBs)
CASH/ASSETS
(1)
CASH/ASSETS
(2)
%BBOD 0.033* (0.091) − 0.099*** (0.000)
%BSSB 0.211** (0.030)
LogBSIZE 0.008 (0.733) − 0.010 (0.514)
%INDEP − 0.041* (0.097) 0.020 (0.290)
LogTA 0.046** (0.022) 0.024* (0.084)
LogAge − 0.056** (0.047) − 0.016 (0.476)
LogZscore − 0.043** (0.021) 0.026* (0.081)
ROAA − 0.001 (0.857) 0.012* (0.061)
GDPCAPITA 0.003 (0.859) − 0.001*** (0.004)
COUNTRY_GOV 0.003 (0.933) 0.053* (0.056)
LogSSBSize 0.068* (0.080)
Constant − 0.512 (0.232) − 0.321 (0.241)
Year fixed effect YES YES
Bank fixed effect YES YES
Observations 150 236
Overall  R2 0.804 0.543
Wald  Chi2 700*** 463***
LM statistics (p value) 0.000 0.000
Sargan test (p value) 0.765 0.832
%BBOD = %BSSB (F-test) 0.002
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%INDEP, ROAA, LogTA, GDPCAPITA, and LogSSBSize. For the full sample, ISLAMIC 
is also included.
Table 7 presents the results for the full sample (Panel A), IBs (Panel B) and CBs (Panel C). 
We find that for the full sample (Panel A), the coefficient on BODC/NI is significant and nega-
tive, implying that BOD busyness is negatively related to board compensation. A similar result 
is observed for CBs (Panel B), which suggests that low board compensation is a significant 
determinant for outside directors’ busyness in CBs. However, this effect is not evidential in 
IBs due to an insignificant coefficient on BODC/NI (Panel B, column 1).
Furthermore, in Panel B (column 2), we find a significant and positive association between 
SSBC/NI and %BSSB. The result provides strong evidence for the main findings that employ-
ing busy Shari’ah advisors is expensive to appoint. This may further explain our main results 
for the low bank value for IBs with busy SSB.
Table 7  Effects of boards compensation on boards busyness—within Islamic and conventional banks
The table presents the OLS regression results for the impacts of boards (BOD/SSB) compensation on their 
busyness for the full sample (Panel A), Islamic banks (Panel B) and Conventional banks subsamples (Panel 
C) for years 2010–2015. Our model is specified as follows
IBs/CBs subsample: %BBODit = 훽0 + 훽1BODC∕NIit + 휙P + 휇Year effects + 휀it
IBs subsample: %BSSBit = 훽0 + 훽1SSBC∕NIit + 휙P + 휇Year effects + 휀it
Compensation of BOD/SSB (BODC/NI; SSBC/NI) is computed as the percentage of net income
Robust standard errors p values in parentheses, *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
Variables Panel A: Full sample 
(IBs and CBs together)
Panel B: Islamic banks (IBs) Panel C: Con-
ventional banks 
(CBs)
%BBOD
(1)
%BBOD
(2)
%BSSB
(3)
%BBOD
(4)
BODC/NI − 0.155** (0.024) 0.345 (0.376) − 0.131** (0.049)
SSBC/NI 0.454** (0.019)
LogBSIZE 0.381*** (0.000) 0.225** (0.015) − 0.115*** (0.007) 0.470*** (0.000)
%INDEP 0.576*** (0.000) 0.706*** (0.000) 0.184*** (0.000) 0.480*** (0.000)
ROAA − 0.007 (0.239) − 0.005 (0.531) − 0.008*** (0.003) 0.005 (0.797)
LogTA − 0.031* (0.068) − 0.010 (0.727) 0.011 (0.383) − 0.042** (0.037)
GDPCAPITA 0.001 (0.304) − 0.002*** (0.010) 0.001** (0.038) 0.002** (0.017)
ISLAMIC − 0.144*** (0.000)
LogSSBSize − 0.470*** (0.000)
Constant − 0.032 (0.901) − 0.154 (0.717) 1.529*** (0.000) − 0.044 (0.893)
Year fixed effect YES YES YES YES
Bank fixed effect YES YES YES YES
Observations 386 150 150 236
Overall  R2 0.168 0.262 0.793 0.177
Wald  Chi2 11*** 17*** 94*** 7***
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8  Sensitivity and robustness checks
8.1  Propensity score matching approach
Methodological problems such as self-selection bias regarding the endogeneity of the 
busyness could arise when investigating the association between board busyness and mar-
ket valuations due to several reasons. First, comparing between banks having busy boards 
with other banks with no busy boards might yield biased estimates of the board busyness 
because the market value of the latter may differ systematically from the value of the for-
mer in the absence of busyness. Thus, if banks with busy boards are found to be priced 
higher, on average, than banks with non-busy boards, the difference could be due to dif-
ferences in banks’ characteristics prior to having busy boards. Secondly, considering only 
banks with busy boards reduces the possibility of having a hypothetical benchmark (i.e., 
the market value of banks with non-busy boards). Additionally, the observed change in 
market valuation could be resulting from shocks influencing all banks equally regardless 
of the busyness board attribute. To overcome these issues, the propensity score matching 
(PSM) method can be utilised as a popular non-parametric approach for estimating causal 
effects (Casu et  al. 2013). We apply the PSM approach to gauge the causal relationship 
between board busyness and bank market value. The board busyness is considered as the 
treatment, the banks having busy boards as the group of treated units, and the banks having 
non-busy boards as the group of non-treated units. Accordingly, we define: (1) a treatment 
(i.e., if a board is involved in multiple-directorship), (2) a group of treated units (i.e., banks 
with busy boards), and (3) a group of non-treated units as a control group (i.e., banks with 
non-busy boards) (see Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008).
We follow the research design of Casu et al. (2013) and implement the PSM method 
through 3 steps: (1) estimating propensity scores for the banks having busy boards and 
banks having non-busy boards, (2) matching banks having busy boards with those having 
non-busy boards, and finally, (3) estimating average board busyness effects. To estimate 
the propensity scores, we employ a probit regression of a dummy variable that has a value 
of one for the bank-year observations with busy boards (i.e., the fraction of busy outside 
directors serving on BODs is at least 50 per cent) and zero otherwise. The main aim of this 
test is not to predict the treatment, but to balance all the covariates between the two groups 
(Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). Given that all control variables (i.e., BODC/NI; LogBSIZE; 
%INDEP; ROAA; LogTA; GDPCAPITA; COUNTRY_GOV; ISLAMIC) included in the 
propensity score model should not be impacted by the treatment; hence, they are lagged by 
1 year which is in line with Casu et al. (2013). After having estimated the propensity scores 
of board busyness, we proceed to match banks having busy boards with those having non-
busy boards. We use the nearest-neighbor matching approach where the unit chosen from 
the banks with non-busy boards as a match for the banks having busy boards, the one clos-
est in terms of the propensity score. Distribution of the Propensity Score of treated and 
non-treated before and after matching is presented in an appendix and shows a good quality 
of our sample matching. Finally, we employ a matched sample to estimate the impacts of 
board busyness on the bank market value. To do so, we first pool the yearly matched banks 
having busy boards and banks having non-busy boards. Then, we compute the changes in 
market value over a 1-year window (presented as “Δ”, that is, Δyit+1 = yit+1 − yit), a 2-year 
window (presented as “Δ”, that is, Δyit+1 = yit+1 − yit−1), and a 3-year window (presented as 
“Δ”, that is, Δyit+1 = yit+1 − yit−2) and estimate the average busyness influences as the dif-
ferences in the mean changes of the market values between banks having busy boards and 
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those with non-busy boards. The statistical significance is based on bootstrapped standard 
errors. If the Δ is different from zero, the change in bank value over the time window for 
the banks having busy boards is different from that for the matched banks having non-busy 
boards (Casu et al. 2013).
Table  8 reports the PSM estimates of the Average Treatment Effects (ATE) of board 
busyness on bank market value of busy BODs for the full sample (Panel A), IBs (Panel 
B) and CBs (Panel C) subsamples. The ATE of BOD busyness on bank market value (Δ) 
is estimated as the difference between the mean changes of banks having busy BOD (i.e., 
“Treated” column) and that of matched banks having non-busy BOD (i.e., “Non-treated” 
column), over a 1-year window, a 2-year window and a 3-year window. Results using PSM 
are generally consistent with our main findings. Specifically, we find that for full sample, 
the Δ is significantly different from zero across all alternative measures for bank value 
which implies that the change in the market value indicator over the time (1, 2 and 3) for 
the banks having busy BOD is different from that for the matched observations having 
non-busy BOD. A positive Δ for bank market value (along with negative coefficients for 
treated and non-treated sample) suggests a smaller drop in the valuation of investors for 
banks having a busy BOD. This finding also indicates a positive effect of busy BOD on 
bank value, which is more pronounced for CBs subsample. As for IBs, a significantly nega-
tive Δ for bank value (along with positive coefficients for treated and non-treated sample) 
over a 2-year window shows a smaller increase in valuation of banks having a busy BOD. 
Although we find a more significant drop in value over a 1-year and a 3-year window for 
banks having busy BOD, none of these estimates is statistically different from zero. Taken 
together, the PSM approach supports our main findings for the two bank types.
8.2  Possible non‑linear relationship between busy boards and bank value
Prior literature (e.g., Jiraporn et  al. 2009) highlights the possible non-linear relationship 
between busy boards and bank value. This is derived from the possible varied impacts of 
board busyness attributes on stock market valuation including busyness and reputation. 
Jiraporn et al. (2009) argue that a simple linear relation cannot fully explain the associa-
tion between board busyness and firm performance. For example, at lower degrees of board 
directorships, the reputation effect may rise higher than a proportional increase in board 
busyness and hence, it tends to outweigh the cost of the busyness effect. However, at higher 
degrees, this impact may grow less than proportionately with an increase in board busy-
ness, leading to the dominance of busyness effect.
To check if such non-linear relation exists in our sampled IBs and CBs, we add the 
square of BOD busyness (i.e., %BBOD2) into the lnQ models (see Table  5). The same 
(opposite) direction on the coefficient of the square variable (i.e., %BBOD2) relative to 
its original form (i.e., %BBOD) indicates a linear (non-linear) relationship between busy 
boards and bank value. We define our simultaneous equations models in Eqs. 7 and 8 as 
follows:
(7)
lnQit = 훽0 + 훽1%BBODit + 훽2%BBOD
2
it
+ 휙P + 휇Year effects + 휋Bank effects + 휀it
(8)
%BBODit = 훽0 + 훽1lnQit + 훽2%BBOD
2
it
+ 휙P + 휇Year effects + 휋Bank effects + 휀it
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For IBs subsample, in addition to BOD busyness variables (i.e., %BBOD; %BBOD2), 
we also add %BSSB and its square form (i.e., %BSSB2) into the above equations to check 
the non-linear association between SSB busyness and IBs market valuation.
Table 9 reports our main results for non-linear testing. For CBs, we find the same sig-
nificant and positive sign of %BBOD2, which indicates a simple linear association between 
busy BOD and firm valuation. This supports the distinctiveness of the roles played and 
value added from BOD in this banking model. This also supports our main findings for 
the preferential impacts of BOD busyness on the market valuation of CBs. However, for 
IBs, the coefficient of %BBOD2 becomes negative and significant while the coefficient on 
%BBOD is insignificant, suggesting that IB investors only begin to negatively price the 
busyness of BOD at the higher degrees of the board outside directorships. Unlike CBs, the 
reputation effects within IBs appear to reduce proportionally as the outside board direc-
torships increase. Hence, at a higher degree of outside directorships, the busyness effect 
seems to outweigh the benefits of the reputation effect in this bank type.
Table 9  Possible non-linear relationship between boards busyness and bank market value—within Islamic 
and conventional banks
The table reports 3LS results for possible non-linear relationships between busy boards and bank market 
valuation for the Islamic bank subsample (Panel A) and Conventional bank subsample (Panel B). We build 
simultaneous equations models
lnQit = 훽0 + 훽1%BBODit + 훽2
(
%BBODit
)2
+ 휙P + 휇Year effects + 휋Bank effects + 휀it (7)
%BBODit = 훽0 + 훽1lnQit + 훽2
(
%BBODit
)2
+ 휙P + 휇Year effects + 휋Bank effects + 휀it (8)
Where, ϕP is a vector of control variables in the bank valuation model including bank-level indicators, 
country-level indicators, and country governance indicators. Models are tested for the period of 6-year from 
2010. The diagnostic tests show that LM statistics p value is less than 1% and Sargan test p value is greater 
than 10% across all models, indicating that the chosen IVs for board of directors’ busyness are valid and the 
models are not over-identified
p values in parentheses, *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. See Table 2 for other variable definitions
Variables Panel A: Islamic banks (IBs) Panel B: Con-
ventional banks 
(CBs)
lnQ
(1)
lnQ
(2)
%BBOD 1.098 (0.103) 0.742** (0.049)
(%BBOD)2 − 0.913* (0.095) 0.963*** (0.007)
%BSSB 5.637*** (0.000)
(%BSSB)2 − 3.792*** (0.000)
Bank-level controls YES YES
Country-level controls YES YES
Constant − 4.471*** (0.002) 3.402** (0.040)
Year fixed effect YES YES
Bank fixed effect YES YES
Observations 150 236
Adjusted  R2 0.987 0.888
Chi2
LM statistics (p value)
Sargan test (p value)
1550***
0.000
0.250
3908***
0.000
0.405
%BBOD = %BSSB (F-test) 0.000
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Furthermore, within IBs, we find the sign of the coefficient on %BSSB2 become signifi-
cantly negative compared to its original form %BSSB. This suggests an inverted non-lin-
ear linkage between SSB busyness and valuations of IB investors. Specifically, at a lower 
degree of outside directorships, busy SSB is associated with higher investors’ valuations. 
However, as the degree of outside directorships increases, the SSB busyness significantly 
reduces bank market value, which supports our main findings and highlights the detrimen-
tal impact of recruiting busy SSB on IBs’ valuation due to substantial lax screening.
8.3  Using accounting‑based measures for bank performance
To address potential measurement errors related to the use of Tobin’s q, we use alterna-
tive measures for bank accounting-based performance represented by the return on assets 
Table 10  Sensitivity tests: using accounting-based measures for bank performance
The table presents 3SLS results when using an accounting-based measures for bank performance: (1) return 
on assets (ROA) and (2) return on equity (ROE) for the Islamic bank subsample (Panel A) and conventional 
bank subsample (Panel B)
p values in parentheses, *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. See Table 2 for other variable definitions
Variables Panel A: Islamic banks (IBs) Panel B: Conventional banks (CBs)
ROA
(1)
ROE
(2)
ROA
(3)
ROE
(4)
%BBOD 1.741 (0.118) 2.020 (0.243) 0.792*** (0.000) 0.626*** (0.000)
%BSSB − 3.012* (0.069) − 3.274* (0.071)
LogBSIZE − 0.804** (0.014) − 1.079*** (0.008) 0.071 (0.121) 0.067 (0.101)
INDEP − 0.251 (0.531) − 0.426 (0.341) − 0.239*** (0.000) − 0.207*** (0.000)
LogTA − 0.396 (0.102) − 0.020 (0.945) − 0.057 (0.120) − 0.040 (0.223)
CAPEX/ASSETS 0.002 (0.806) 0.008 (0.458) − 0.001 (0.914) 0.002 (0.773)
CASH/ASSETS 0.782 (0.489) 0.230 (0.870) − 0.398** (0.049) − 0.359** (0.043)
LEV − 0.078*** (0.008) − 0.056* (0.087) − 0.001 (0.861) 0.007* (0.072)
BIG4 0.687 (0.123) 0.287 (0.548) − 0.103** (0.039) − 0.081* (0.067)
HHI 0.469 (0.276) 0.652 (0.175) − 0.063 (0.600) − 0.017 (0.868)
GDPCAPITA − 0.001 (0.959) − 0.001 (0.925) − 0.007*** (0.000) − 0.005*** (0.000)
COUNTRY_GOV − 0.441 (0.382) − 0.498 (0.357) 0.223*** (0.003) 0.133** (0.038)
Constant 10.545*** (0.005) 5.573 (0.211) 0.537 (0.362) 0.264 (0.614)
Year fixed effect YES YES YES YES
Bank fixed effect YES YES YES YES
Observations 150 150 236 236
Adjusted  R2 0.543 0.400 0.504 0.469
Chi2
LM statistics (p value)
Sargan test (p value)
100***
0.000
0.260
68***
0.000
0.236
379***
0.000
0.105
238***
0.000
0.143
%BBOD = %BSSB 
(F-test)
0.000 0.000
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(ROA) and return on equity (ROE) (Fich and Shivdasani 2006; Cashman et  al. 2012).14 
Specifically, we examine our two study hypotheses across both bank types using these 
alternative measures as our dependent variables.
Results are reported in Table 10 for both bank types and, generally, remain unchanged. 
For IBs, we find no significant evidence on the association between firm performance and 
busy BOD, but a busy SSB is associated with significantly low firm performance. In con-
trast, CBs report a positive association between the busy board and each of the indicators 
ROA and ROE. These results suggest that our main findings are not driven by potential 
measurement errors or model misspecifications when using lnQ.
Table 11  Sensitivity tests: using alternative measure for boards busyness
The table presents 3SLS results when using an alternative measure of board busyness: (1) average out-
side directorships per outside director (ABOD) and (2) average outside directorships per Shari’ah advisors 
(ASSB) for the Islamic bank subsample (Panel A) and Conventional bank subsample (Panel B)
p values in parentheses, *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. See Table 2 for other variable definitions
Variables Panel A: Islamic banks (IBs) Panel B: Conven-
tional banks (CBs)
lnQ
(1)
LnQ
(2)
ABOD − 0.046 (0.349) 0.080*** (0.000)
ASSB − 1.256** (0.049)
LogBSIZE − 0.603** (0.014) 0.100 (0.129)
INDEP − 0.715** (0.028) − 0.254*** (0.003)
LogTA − 0.426 (0.125) − 0.168*** (0.004)
CAPEX/ASSETS − 0.032 (0.120) − 0.001 (0.737)
CASH/ASSETS 3.317 (0.101) − 0.107 (0.750)
LEV − 0.062 (0.137) 0.003 (0.643)
BIG4 − 2.435** (0.049) − 0.076 (0.286)
HHI − 1.326* (0.065) 0.428** (0.024)
GDPCAPITA 0.002 (0.797) − 0.006** (0.029)
COUNTRY_GOV 0.362 (0.401) 0.196* (0.069)
Constant 28.750** (0.049) 2.221** (0.024)
Year fixed effect YES YES
Bank fixed effect YES YES
Observations 150 236
Adjusted  R2 0.823 0.978
Chi2
LM statistics (p value)
Sargan test (p value)
2625***
0.000
0.114
1082***
0.000
0.157
%BBOD = %BSSB (F-test) 0.000
14 Unreported descriptive statistics show that IBs have a significantly lower ROA (ROE) of 0.476 (7.707) in 
comparison with their conventional counterparts (1.585; 12.827).
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8.4  Using alternative measures for busy boards
We change our measure of busy boards and re-estimated the main models by using an alter-
native measure of board busyness (see Fich and Shivdasani 2006; Cashman et al. 2012). 
These measures are the average outside directorships per outside director (ABOD) and the 
average outside directorships per Shari’ah advisors (ASSB). The results are reported in 
Table 11 and show consistent observations for busy BOD across the two bank types and 
also for busy SSB within IBs.
8.5  Using first‑differenced regression models
In this section, we capture unobserved time-invariant effects by employing first-differenced 
regressions for all variables (except for dummy variable BIG4) in 3SLS models. Results 
for IBs and CBs subsample are presented in Table 12 (Panel A and B, respectively). Our 
Table 12  Robustness checks: using first-differenced regression models
The table presents first-differenced regression (3SLS) results for the Islamic bank subsample (Panel A) and 
Conventional bank subsample (Panel B) identifying the effect of busy board of directors or busy SSB on a 
bank’s firm value
p values in parentheses, *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. First-differenced models are used to control for 
time-invariant unobserved effects. See Table 2 for other variable definitions
Variables Panel A: Islamic banks (IBs) Panel B: Con-
ventional banks 
(CBs)
lnQ
(1)
lnQ
(2)
D.%BBOD 0.121 (0.202) 0.382*** (0.000)
D.%BSSB − 0.741*** (0.007)
D.LogBSIZE 0.045 (0.386) 0.103 (0.176)
D.INDEP − 0.026 (0.752) − 0.220* (0.085)
D.LogTA 0.036 (0.568) 0.228** (0.014)
D.CAPEX/ASSETS 0.003** (0.046) − 0.001 (0.802)
D.CASH/ASSETS 0.057 (0.786) − 0.588* (0.098)
D.LEV 0.018*** (0.009) − 0.012 (0.165)
BIG4 − 0.047** (0.027) − 0.081 (0.377)
D.HHI 0.018 (0.808) 0.397* (0.088)
D.GDPCAPITA − 0.001 (0.434) − 0.001** (0.045)
D.COUNTRY_GOV 0.023 (0.365) 0.137*** (0.001)
Constant − 0.064** (0.028) 0.016 (0.618)
Year fixed effect YES YES
Observations 123 193
Adjusted  R2 0.008 0.267
Chi2
LM statistics (p value)
Sargan test (p value)
42***
0.000
0.243
55***
0.000
0.063
%BBOD = %BSSB (F-test) 0.000
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results remain unchanged for both bank types. That is, a busy BOD in CBs is highly-priced 
than that in IBs, and SSB busyness is detriment the stock market valuations of IBs.
We additionally test the robustness of our results using a two-step system Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) estimator (Arellano and Bover 1995; Blundell and Bond 
1998). The GMM also controls for the unobserved effects by transforming the variables 
into first-differences to eliminate unobserved heterogeneity and omitted variable bias. It 
allows us to treat all bank characteristics variables as endogenous and orthogonally employs 
the lag values of endogenous variables as IVs (Hermalin and Weisbach 2003; Mollah and 
Zaman 2015; Mollah et al. 2017). Macroeconomics control variables are treated as strictly 
exogenous. Unreported results are found to be consistent with the main findings identi-
fied through 3SLS. Overall findings in this section indicate that our main results are not 
affected by unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity.
9  Conclusions
Motivated by the long controversy regarding the effect of board busyness on firm value, 
we investigate whether board busyness affects stock market valuations. To the best of our 
knowledge, it is the first study to examine this association in banking and specifically the 
first study to identify possible differential valuations of board busyness across alternative 
banking systems (i.e., Islamic versus conventional banks). Our results indicate that a busy 
board of directors generally promotes high market valuations in support of additional pref-
erential benefits that a busy board can generate for their banks. However, investors across 
the two bank types showed distinct perceptions of appointing a busy board of directors. In 
conventional banks, investors assign a high valuation for busy board while Islamic banks’ 
investors do not significantly price a busy board. Our results also show that investors in 
Islamic banks consistently perceive busy Shari’ah boards as damaging the bank value. 
Additional analyses indicate that underlying channels, such as the agency conflicts and 
board compensation, can explain the different effects between the two bank types of board 
busyness on market valuations.
Overall findings suggest that investors engaging with Islamic banking tend to be more 
sensitive to SSB busyness while they penalise their banks for not allocating any significant 
pricing for the board of directors’ busyness. These results imply that despite the importance 
of having a double-layer governance mechanism in an Islamic banking system, enhancing 
the credibility and trust for this banking business model might not hold in the presence 
of lax monitoring. This could promote withdrawal and systematic risks for this banking 
sector. Results showing the positive influence of board busyness on conventional banks’ 
valuations can partially alleviate concerns related to ineffective monitoring. These findings 
reinforce the evidence by Conyon and Read (2006) indicating that limiting the number of 
directorships of the board of directors is not necessarily an ideal regulatory response to 
board busyness. Furthermore, Islamic banks can learn from conventional banks on how to 
effectively exploit the possible reputation benefits associated with appointing busy outside 
directors and how to successfully signal such information to stock markets to increase the 
equity value for their banks.
Findings in this study contribute to the on-going debate related to the different layers of 
governance mechanisms and the importance of considering institutional environments as well 
as distinct business models employed by alternative banking systems. Results in this study 
can inform both investors’ investment choices and regulators about the implications that board 
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busyness could have, distinctively, on the two bank types. Moreover, for countries operating 
on dual-banking systems, standard setters should provide detailed guidance to govern board 
multiple-directorships and to consider stock market responsiveness to busyness information 
within different bank settings. Future research in this arena may extend the busyness issue 
and assess the economic consequences of appointing a busy board with sufficient and relevant 
qualifications (e.g., accounting and financial expertise and continuing education).
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